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recourse is still available through the Legislature and it will be
interesting to observe the treatment which any such petitions will
receive in the future ."
CAMERON HARVEY*

CRIMINAL LAW--SENTENCING-WHITE COLLAR CRIME-FACTORS TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT-THE RELEVANCE OF RETRIBUTION.-Once or twice per year, a Canadian court hands down a
decision in which there is an extensive discussion of the problem of
sentencing . The annual case is no mere ten line dismissal of the
appeal saying "We do not feel that the sentence is out of proportion to those imposed for similar offences . . ." . In the past there
have been cases' in which some provincial court of appeal pontificates on punishment, delivers homilies on the aims of the criminal
law and expounds conventional wisdom on the vices of criminals
and the virtues of prisons.
Regina v. Hinch and Salanski' is, the most interesting sentencing
case reported since the plight of Toronto's arsonist Robert Roberts
received considerable public and professional attention. The deceedings (1966-1967), vol. 2, pp. 2761-2762 . This member suggested that
the courts be given a general power upon application to enlarge limitation
periods in cases of hardship ; such a provision would overcome the present
situation in which the composition of the Legislature from time to time
and possibly the political power of the sponsor of the bill can be determinative.
"Recently, the Second Session of the 28th Legislature gave an inkling
of its present disposition to such petitions in the treatment it gave to An
Act for the Relief of Jacob A. Johnson and Donelda M . Johnson (1968,
bill 64) ; presumably due to solicitor's error, the statement of claim in connexion with a particular action on the part of the petitioners, which had
been commenced in time, had not been served within the time specified
therefor under the governing Rules made pursuant to The Queen's Bench
Act, R .S .M., 1954, c . 52 . Generally speaking, the object of the bill was
to attempt to obtain an enlargement of the time for serving the statement
of claim . The bill received second reading after a very brief debate consisting of three speakers, who expressed opposition, but were willing to
allow the bill to go to committee where more complete explanations could
be made in support of or in opposition to it by the parties involved (see
Debates and Proceedings (1968), pp . 1876-1877) ; the bill was allowed to
die in committee and was not reported.
*Cameron Harvey, of the Faculty of Law, University of Manitoba,
Winnipeg, Manitoba.
'E.g . Regina v. Roberts _(1963), 39 C .R . 1 (Ont .) ; Regina v. Holden
(1962), 40 W.W .R . 571 (B .C .C.A .) ; Regina v . Heck (1963), 41 W .W.R .
629 (B .C .C .A .) ; Regina v. Jones (1956), 115 C .C .C . 273 (Ont . C .A .) ;
Regina V. Allen (1954), 108 C .C.C . 102 (Sask . C.A.) ; Regina v. Willaert
(1953), 105 C.C .C. 172 (Ont . C.A.) .
2 (1968), 62 W .W.R . 205 (B .C.C .A .) .
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bate in Roberts' concerned the struggle between law and psychiatry; the protection of the public from a dangerous pyromaniac
versus the therapeutic need to release him when cured even if
this cure was achieved in a relatively short time . The result was,
at best, a stalemate. In Hinch and Salanski, the struggle is much
more complicated. The case can be examined on many levels ; it
shows the peculiar qualities of white collar crime, the fate of
middle-class criminals, the "politics" of small-town justice and the
predilections of Court of Appeal judges faced with deciding an
appeal against sentence.
Hinch and Salanski were convicted of conspiring to obtain
money by false pretences. The evidence shows that it is very
likely that they could also have been convicted of the completed
crime of obtaining money by false pretences ; the report does not
state whether such a charge was laid or withdrawn. The Crown
appealed the sentence imposed.
The respondents were businessmen. They were principals in
a limited company and were associated in three partnerships . All
of these enterprises were connected with the construction industry.
A third party played a crucial role in the circumstances of the
case. Mead was an employee of the British Columbia Hydro and
Power Authority. His official title was assistant land supervisor
and in that capacity, he was responsible for letting out contracts
and checking invoices presented by contractors. Mead told Hinch
that contracts with British Columbia Hydro would be available
and, in due course, such contracts were let to the respondents. At
this stage there is no evidence that either Mead or the respondents
had done anything illegal. Mead then informed the respondents,
however, that, if Hinch and Salanski wanted more contracts, Mead
"wanted to be paid or receive a kick-back" .' This British Columbia
Hydro employee described to the respondents a system whereby
his "reward" could be bestowed without expense to the contractors. Hinch and Salanski agreed and the plan was put into operation . Along with legitimate bills for work actually done, the respondents submitted on their own bill-heads spurious accounts for work
which had never been done, for work already paid for and by
simply submitting inflated accounts . In his official capacity, Mead
approved payment of these fake bills. When the respondents received the British Columbia Hydro cheques, they forwarded the
proceeds of the falsifications to Mead's bank account in Alberta .
The frauds continued for eight months before being discovered and
' Supra, footnote 1 .
1 Supra, footnote 2, at p. 214.

1969]

Commentaires

117

amounted to $21,937.00. ®n being discovered, Mead . committed
suicide, the respondents were charged with conspiracy and British
Columbia Hydro instituted a civil suit against Hinch and Salanski
for the recovery of the money wrongfully obtained .
The reader is asked to consider two questions : What sentence
would the courts be likely to give in those circumstances and,
secondly, what sentence should have been imposed? To make this
guessing game appear fairer (and closer to the data available . to
the sentencing magistrate) some background information should
be provided . Neither man had any previous convictions . Hinch
was fifty years of age . Salanski was forty. Although neither was
described as a "pillar" of their particular religious organisations,
both were described by that classic term "a family man" . In addition, Salanski was a member of a service club . What is the
mystique of being a "family man"? Would a bachelor or a divorcee
be less trustworthy, more capable of wickedness, less susceptible
to reformation or more likely to have criminal tendencies? These
pieces of folk-lore or conventional wisdom which appear so regularly in pre-sentence reports and the remarks of sentencing magisstrates have no intrinsic 'value in assessing punishment but they
seem to have a Pavlovian effect on sentencers . More nonsense is
talked by lawyers speaking to mitigation of punishment than at
most other times. At least many remarks made by lawyers appear
to be nonsensical but frequently they seem to have some effect.
References to church attendance, good "clean" habits (whatever
they might be) and love of parents or wife and children (or vice
versa) seem to have magical effects on magistrates . Conventions
appear to have been established in this sentencing and mitigation
process although these criteria have no discernible legal or sociological validity . In addition to the references to parenthood, religious and living habits, is it true that a man represented by a
lawyer will be dealt with more leniently than an unrepresented man
who remains silent on the allocatur? In Toronto, there used to be
lawyers who were well known in the magistrates' courts for applying for adjournments or speaking to sentence for a fee of approximately fifty dollars. ®n one occasion such a lawyer, who had been
paid this sum of money, was at a loss to say anything in his client's
favour, so he simply announced to the judge that "My client has
lived in Toronto all his life". That was the end of the plea in mitigation. Did the magistrate take that factor into account when
handing out sentence? Did the magistrate automatically adjust
sentence when he realised that the accused had paid for his law-
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yer's services and therefore the financial outlay should be taken
into account? (Perhaps it was wise of the founders of the Ontario
legal aid scheme to attempt to conceal the status of the scheme's
clients from the trial judges .)
The respondents, who had many prominent citizens of their
hometown supporting them by letters to the court, were each sentenced to one month in jail and a $2,000 .00 fine . Is this a proper
sentence? The question is not whether it is an adequate sentence
because that suggests that the time spent in jail should be longer
and that is not necessarily true.
The Crown appealed on the basis that the sentence was inadequate because of the seriousness of the offence and the "magnitude
of the amounts received and the period of time that the accused
was (sic) involved in the conspiracy".'
With respect, there are few instances of remarks on sentence
which seem as one-sided as those made by the magistrate. Although criticism of sentencing is, of course, much easier than ad
ministering that delicate part of the administration of justice, the
remarks of the magistrate do not appear to reflect that judicial
quality one expects from the bench. Admittedly, a mere law report
does not allow the critic to make a completely accurate evaluation;
for instance, we do not know the emotional climate of the community where the offence was committed or the compassion felt
for the accused persons . Moreover a two to one majority of the
British Columbia Court of Appeal, agreed with the magistrate and
saw little to quarrel with in his remarks. This attitude seems strange
in a court which has taken such a stringent view of the habitual
criminal laws in recent years.'
The magistrate's remarks are worth quoting at some length .
He said:'

This is certainly different from the usual type of case that I have, where
there is a definite knowledgeable wrong-doing that can be attributed
to the accused person without hestitation.

s Ibid., at p. 215 .
6 It might be more accurate to say that the administration of criminal
justice in British Columbia is preoccupied with Part XXI of the Criminal
Code, S.C ., 1953-54, c. 51 as am . E.g ., Regina v. Buckingham, [1965] 2
C.C .C. 229 (B.C .C.A.) ;Regina v. Swontek, [1965] 1 . C.C .C. 242 (B .C .C .A.) ;
Regina v. Ball (1965), 56 W.W.R . 313 (B .C.C .A .) ; Regina v. MacNeill
(1965), 53 W.W.R . 244 (B .C .C.A.) ; Regina v. Jones, [1966] 2 C.C .C. 370
(B .C .C.A .) ; Regina v. Morgan, [1966] 2 C.C.C . 390 (B .C .C .A .) ; Regina v.
Smith, [1967] 3 C.C.C . 265 (B .C.C .A .) ; Paton v. Regina (1968), 63
W.W.R . 713 (S .C .C .) . But compare Regina v. Jeffries, [1965] 1 C.C .C .
247 (B.C .C.A .) ; Regina v. Sparrow, [1966] 4 C.C .C. 137 (B .C.C.A.) ;
Regina v. Channing (1965), 52 W.W.R. 99 (B .C .C .A.) .
7
Supra, footnote 2, at p. 207.
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This statement -is remarkable when the respondents had
pleaded guilty and stood before the magistrate for sentence on an
offence to which mens rea is applied and which carried a maximum
penalty of ten years' imprisonment . The statement is clearly wrong
both in fact and law. A good argument could be made for degrees
of "blameworthiness" or "guilt" but our present Criminal Code is
not sufficiently sophisticated to embrace such notions . In any event,
the facts of this case hardly leave the impression that we are here
dealing with two criminals who were the innocent dupes of a
rogue who totally hoodwinked them. Yet this is the impression
which the magistrate gives of the case because he continued by
saying.'
I see two men of the age of these two, of previously unblemished
record, married, families, with no gain except the right to work.
Of course, we could suggest to the magistrate that when bank
robbers start out in their trade, they have exactly the same outlook
as he attributes to Hinch and Salanski, if, by "right to work", he
means the natural desire to support their wives and families .
The magistrate went on to say that the respondents are "faced
with a civil suit, and are the victims of a most unprecedented skill
in deception and daring" .'
This rather weighted version of the facts continued :
I must keep in mind the terrific loss of pride that each of these previously unblemished charactered people have suffered already, at the
hands of somebody who was unconscionable and in a position of great
trust, wielding a great club ."
There is, of course, some truth in this statement. The unvarnished facts suggest that the respondents would have had little
chance of receiving the contracts if Mead had not decided in their
favour. ®n the other hand, they share a common trait with other
criminals in that they yielded to the temptation to take an easy
way out rather than find other work or, perhaps, expose the dishonesty of Mead. One would imagine that Mr. Salanski's service
club may have instilled some such civic duty in his mind.
Finally, the magistrate concluded his remarks in mitigation by
saying:"
I wonder much-how much they have lost through their weaknesses in
not being able to, and not having the immediate strength to see what is
right .
These compassionate statements contain worthy sentiments in
a criminal process which now purports to be dedicated to the re8 Ibid.

s Ibid .

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid .
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habilitative ideal but the "losses" referred to by the magistrate
appear a trifle intangible when one remembers that Messrs . Hinch
and Salanski presumably made a profit from their contracting
operations . The size of their profits is not mentioned in any of the
judgments ; this is a curious omission to which further reference
will be made.
The British Columbia Court of Appeal, per Norris J.A. considered that the magistrate's remarks, which have been quoted at
but that
length were "unfortunately (and too broadly) worded
there was no error in law or fact. The majority of the Court of
Appeal found little difficulty in understanding the magistrate's
point of view. Norris J .A. believed that in the reference to "without
hestitation" (in the first paragraph quoted) which seemed to refer
to a surprising lack of mens rea, the magistrate meant that the case
was an unusual one. This explanation is, with respect, mystifying .
In another paragraph, not quoted above, the magistrate had made
reference to "no personal gain" but Norris J.A., in his role as
judicial interpreter, believed that this should "undoubtedly" be
read in the light of the earlier refence to "no gain except the right
to work" .
The illogicality of the magistrate's remarks is best illustrated
by a paragraph which appears to have been added as an afterthought . This paragraph contradicts everything which the magis
trate seemed to have said about lack of mens rea, the victimised
position of Hinch and Salanski and the need for a light penalty
which was in fact imposed. In this passage, the magistrate had
said ;
On the other hand, was not what unquestionably occurred a serious
crime against all of the people of this country? They entered into a
common design, an agreement, to do something unlawful, and unlawful
to their knowledge, as to call for a penalty up to fourteen years.
This qualifying statement by the magistrate is so inconsistent
as to make nonsence of what went before.
Therefore, Norris J.A. (with Branca J.A . concurring), after
considering the various facets of punishment, decided that the
Crown appeal should fail. In making this decision, the learned
appellate judge said :"
9112

13

l4

Any conviction and sentence of imprisonment, apart from the fines
imposed, would be almost totally destructive of these respondents in

at p.
at p.
maximum is ten
Ibid ., at p.
12 Ibid.,
14 Ibid .,
1s

208 .
11 Ibid.
207 . The reference to fourteen years was erroneous; the
years.
212 .
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the small community. It is likely that the learned magistrate had under
consideration what might be called the side effects of the conviction
and sentence such as restrictions on travel and emigration to another
country and the limitation on future employment. The conviction and
sentence are on the records of the respondents for life . All these
matters the learned magistrate doubtless had in mind, and, . . . it cannot be said that the learned magistrate imposed an inordinately low
sentence and was clearly wrong.

There would be much to recommend this statement if it reflected a consistently lenient policy of the trial and appellate courts
of Canada . Norris J.A. also -struck a realistic note when he sug
gested that a month in jail and a $2,000 .00 fine may appear inadequate in a large urban centre while the same sentence in a
rural community may have a very different effect because, in the
latter, "associations are close, and community, social and religious
status is judged more severely" .16
Another reason stated for dismissing the appeal has less
validity . Norris J.A . observed "in passing" that the respondents
had each served their month in jail and were "endeavouring to
rehabilitate themselves for some months"." To re-arrest them and
return them to jail because of an alleged mistake of the magistrate "would add unduly to their punishment and would savour
of harassment, a result which, with respect, we should not bring
about unless we are under compulsion to do because of particularly
outrageous circumstances resulting in a clear miscarriage of justice, which I do not think is the case here"."
Norris J.A . also discussed the irrelevancy of retribution (which
will be examined more fully below) and this is certainly a salutary attitude toward sentencing.
Looking at the majority judgment as a whole, there are very
few tangible criticisms which one could make except to impugn
the rather superficial examination of the simplistic and inconsistent
statements of the magistrate . An argument can be made that any
comment on sentencing policy is irrelevant because it is so individualized that precedents and policy are of very limited use.
Such an attitude is debatable and certainly is so in cases where an
appeal court lays down such fundamental principles as the British
Columbia Court of Appeal set forth in Regina v. Hinch and Salanski. There seems to be no jurisprudence on the advisability (or
ethics) of applying rules of stare decisis to sentencing cases. Why
should the rule of precedent not apply in these circumstances?
At least loose rules of precedent seem to apply to cases under

"Ibid.

17 Ibid.

18 Ib'id., at pp . 212-213 .
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sections 695 (dangerous sexual offender) and 661 (habitual
criminal) of the Criminal Code. If it can be applied to such
crucial cases involving permanent incarceration, (or loss of freedom) then it should apply to the no less important decisions
relating to first offenders, and other identifiable types of offences
or offenders . This should certainly be the case if we are seeking,
however vainly, a viable rationale for the criminal process . Of
course, sentencing has always been described as a very special,
exacting and emotionally demanding task which judges approach
with great trepidation and some misgiving. The problem of sentencing is aggravated by the individualisation of the rehabilitative
ideal which places a premium on the more positive qualities of
the individual offender so that justice can be done while attempting
to salvage an asocial citizen . Judges may feel confined by binding
precedent when the essence of sentencing is not equality of treatment, but uniformity in approaching the problems . Perhaps there
is another dimension to this problem. Court decisions may not
have a lasting and winding role because penal practices change.
No one suggests that penal administrators and criminologists
should dictate to the courts but, in practice, penologists may resent a system which takes no account of new knowledge or changes
in penal policy . A jurisprudence of decisions has developed in
cases relating to habitual criminals and sexual psychopaths . Anyone who has made even a cursory examination of these decisions
would be struck by the analytical quality of the interpretation of
sections 659 and 661 of the Criminal Code. This black letter
approach has not resulted in a cohesive legal policy and, moreover,
there is almost a total disdain for penal or criminological considerations. Perhaps the interpretation of these sections (particularly by the British Columbia Court of Appeal) does not offer
much encouragement to those who would like to avoid decisions
such as in Hinch and Salanski by establishing some coherent
policy .
The decision in Hinch and Salanski is disquieting . First, this
dissatisfaction is due to the inconsistency of the courts which is
implicit in the present judgment . This is not to suggest that there
should be uniformity of sentences ; it does imply, however, that
the court in the case under review has applied criteria (which
may be most worthwhile) which it is not willing to apply to all
cases . If we take into account the strong familial connexions of
our two building contractors (who also happen to be cheats),
then why not listen to the pleas of a tearful wife who legitimately
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claims that the judge, in sending her husband to jail for months
or years, is robbing her of a loving husband, her children of - a
devoted and dutiful parent and her home of an efficient breadwinner? If a pre-sentence report attempts to show that a convicted person is most contrite and has been punished enough by
the mere formalistic appearance in court, then why incarcerate
him for a number of years? If a priest, as character witness, tells
the sentencing judge, that a term in a reformatory would do his
eighteen year old parishioner more harm than good and that the
church will watch over him, why persist in sentencing him to
prison? If a prisoner is as much a victim as a participant in a
crime, why should the court refuse to take notice of this fact and
made pious and self-defeating statements about the need to set an
example and to deter the weak-willed criminal from accepting the
advice of rogues on future occasions? If judges persist (as they
frequently do) in applying a quantitative measure to punishment so
that a $20,000.00 theft is at least five times as bad as a $2,000 .00
defalcation, then how can the sentence in Hinch and Salanski be
justified?
None of these illustrations and rhetorical questions is exaggerated. If one could be assured that the decision in the present
case was the first faint glimmer of a new light on crime and its
punishment, then one could have hope but the simple fact is that
the hope is unjustified . Since the British Columbia Court of Appeal decided Hinch and Salanski, they have no doubt dismissed
appeals against much stiffer sentences and have upheld findings .
of habitual criminality on technical legal grounds. A random
glance at any Toronto newspaper shows, for instance, that accused persons, with previously unblemished characters, have been
sentenced to much more than one month in jail for liquor, drug
and sexual offences .
An alternative explanation must be sought. One of the most
obvious is that the decision in Hinch and Salanski is based largely
on socio-economic grounds. This explanation, even if without
merit, hardly needed to be expressed in the crude language of the
sentencing magistrate.
®n this basis, among others, it is therefore rather ludicrous for
Norris J.A . to suggest that retribution is not a factor in sentencing
and "not in accord with the present day concept of the purposes of
the criminal law" ." The judge's statement takes on added irony
when he suggests that applying vengeance "involves a loss of that
11

Ibid., at p. 210.
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objectivity which is essential to the exercise of the judicial process".2°
This is not to suggest that retribution should be a factor or
that the dissenting appellate judge was correct in suggesting a sentence of eighteen months . As much as one may be inclined to be
lieve that white collar crime by "respectable" businessmen may be
as much (if not more) of a danger to our society as bank robbery, imprisonment is probably no solution. Secondly, the categorization of the rationale of punishment (into deterrence, reformation, protection of society and retribution) is not useful and
largely meaningless. Thirdly, punishment in the form of imprisonment serves very little purpose in any event and would serve no
good in the case of these middle aged, middle class entrepreneurs.
It would make much more sense if, regardless of its direct punitive effect, the Crown demanded, and obtained an order which
fined our two criminals $100,000 .00 each or debarred them from
any future government contracts (although this may be an automatic effect in any event) . Perhaps the practice adopted in the
United States in anti-trust cases could be applied to the criminal
process so that our dishonest businessman was forced to pay
"triple damages" in effect-say, three times the bribe paid or
three times the profit made through the illegal transaction. These
suggestions are attempts to break down the present artificial line
beween civil and criminal legal matters. Although such a breakdown may not be satisfactory in some areas, such as murder or
rape, it may be the best solution in those where the major damage
is economic . This may be the solution for two reasons. If we are
serious in our belief that retribution has no part to play in the
criminal law, then we should make the obvious obeisance to the
new penal enlightenment. Secondly, economic "punishment" may
have the greatest deterrent effect . Thirdly, there seems to be some
confusion in our free enterprise society because we cannot decide
what is (or should be) criminal in the economic field. We need
some effective means of expressing community disapproval if,
indeed, that is our intention . Perhaps it would be better to fight
financial problems with a monetary weapon . This notion of compensation rather than punishment could spread to such "crimes"
as those involving criminal negligence or "unlawful act"-involuntary homicide . Many of the defendants to these charges are
able to pay and should be forced to do so . Most of them do not
have "guilty" minds. In fact, many of our businessmen, and tax"Ibid ., at p. 209 .

Commentaires

1969]

125

payers, are unable to draw a distinction between what is merely
sharp practice on expert advice and what is a fraudulent act or
scheme .
Obviously, the lack of clarity in the aims of the criminal law
is well illustrated by this grey area of illegal economic acts and
asocial activity . . Perhaps it would be an ideal place in which to
implement a plan for erasing criminal records when the convicted
person has lived an honest, law-abiding life for five years or more .
This scheme, which has been gaining popularity recently, would
minimise retribution and de-accentuate the differences between
torts and crimes .
These references to "guilt" or differentiations between various
frames of mind have a curious propensity to lead us back to the
"hardcore" guilt-ridden, blameworthy types of behaviour which
are the basic crimes . If these acts continue to be crimes, are we not
suggesting that most of them are punished by death (rarely now)
or long terms of imprisonment for reasons which are based on
thinly disguised retribution?
As stated above, the categorization of the rationales of punishment are unreal and misleading, and by singling out retribution,
one must not fall into the same error. To suggest however that
these terms of imprisonment are anything other than vengeance
is gilding the lily .
Norris J.A . in Hinch and Salanski pointed out that one of the
objects of the criminal law is "to maintain a standard of behaviour necessary for the welfare of the community . (which in
cludes the welfare of the offender) "." He went on to say that, in
sentencing, the public welfare encompassed the "safety of the
public", "the deterrent effect of a sentence", punishment," and
reformation of the offender . Most of the above is question-begging or, alternatively, imponderable . To suggest that the aim of the
criminal law is to maintain proper standards of community behaviour and to state that the public welfare aims, inter alia, at the
safety of the public certainly does not tell us very much . Norris
J.A . also said that the sentence of the court seeks to have a deterrent effect . What do we know of deterrence? Admittedly, deterrence may be the most important consideration in criminal law
and involves the whole notion of criminal lawwe are hoping to
stop citizens from doing acts of which we disapprove at the present
time and we are hoping that they will not repeat them. But this
definition of deterrence tells us nothing because we can deter by
21

Ibid.

22 Ibid .
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choosing the most dangerous criminals and incarcerating them for
the remainder of their natural lives, we may deter by imposing
long sentences whether for revenge or for purposes of rehabilitation. Finally we may deter by suspending sentence or placing on
probation . Therefore, Norris J.A.'s categories have very little meaning because we have so little knowledge o£ the effects of the penal
dispositions made. If we wish to protect society then anti-social
behaviour must be stopped and that requires a formula of which
we know little at the present time. We must make the best economic use of our resources ;" the truly dangerous, in a physical sense,
must undoubtedly be kept in such security that they cannot repeat
their depredations . This should be a relatively small group who
will increasingly be dealt with in a psychiatric way . What of the
others? We must ensure that we are not retributive but this hardly
coincides with Norris J.A.'s concept of that term. This much is
obvious from the passages he quoted in support of his thesis that
retribution is irrelevant. He cited Middleton J.A. in Rex v. Childs"
who conceived of the lex talionis as being "torture, whipping and
solitary confinement" . Everyone knows that the modern vengeful
society is not that unsubtle . Similarly the British Columbia Court of
Appeal cited Roach J.A. in Rex v. Warner, Urquart, Martin and
Mullen" where it was said that there must be "a right proportion
between the punishment imposed and the gravity of the offence".
"It is in that sense", said Roach J.A. "that certain crimes 'deserve' certain punishments and not on any theory of retribution" .~'
This statement, on the other hand, seems too subtle for the average
mind. Yet it contains the essence of the problem in the present case
and the uneasiness which it created . The value system under which
the court operated has a rather twisted notion of desert . A court
which can jail union officials for a year (admittedly in the name
of deterrence) for a quasi-criminal contempt of court will have
some problem convincing many people that they are not being
vengeful ." Similarly appellate courts which can permanently incarcerate a homosexual (who had no pedophilic or violent tendencies) as a "dangerous sexual offender" when it was proved
that he was nothing of the sort is hardly convincing in protestations that they are not vengeful ."
=a See Outerbridge, The
Corr. 378 .
"(1939), 71 C .C .C. 70
'' (1946), 87 C .C .C . 13
See Regina v. Neale,
175 (B .C .C.A.) .

Tyranny of Treatment (196$), . 10 Can . J . of
(Ont . C .A .), cited at p . 209, supra, footnote 2 .
zc Supra, footnote 2, at p . 210 .
(Ont . C . A .) .
Clarke, O'Keef}e and Power, [19671 2 C .C.C .

"Klippert v. The Queen (1967), 2 C.R .N .S . 319 (S.C .C .) .
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What of the dissent of Robertson J.A . in Hinch and Salanski?
Does that offer any light or encouragement? Robertson J.A. considered that the magistrate had misdirected himself and found the
suggestion that the respondents were victims erroneous and misleading. (For instance, the magistrate made reference to Mead who
was "armed with a terrific authority which created this horrible opportunity" and that Mead "wielded tremendous power, tremendous influence, and was, in fact, able to create an empire for himself".") Robertson J.A . found these statements exaggerated at best
and pointed out, as stated earlier, that the respondents could
have declined all further contracts instead of entering into new
ventures and preparing false documents. Similarly, the learned
judge believed that the magistrate was wrong to accept defence
counsel's submissions that the respondents had "not received, in
these circumstances, an illicit penny" ." Robertson J.A . pointed out
that Hinch and âalanski entered into the agreements for the profit
motive and had looked upon the payments to Mead as "an ex=
pense of carrying on a profitable business"."
Finally, in considering sentence, Robertson J.A . stated that,
in his opinion, a sentence of five years would not have been disturbed on appeal . He decided, however, that he would substitute
a term of eighteen months, taking into account the lack of previous
record, their standing in the community, their repentance, and
that "men whose environments have been such as those of the
respondents will probably find it harder to bear any given term
of imprisonment than a man who has once been incarcerated and
chooses to risk imprisonment again by committing a subsequent
offence" ." He also believed that a very long sentence was not
necessary as the respondents had "probably learned their lesson
by now" . He refused to take into account the fact that a successful
civil suit had been instituted against them and that one had mortgaged his house to pay the judgment . I3[e called this "merely
bowing to the inevitable"."
One could agree with all the following except the type of
sentence . The judge believed that deterrence was the key factor .
(He dismissed the notion of retribution because any sentence that
satisfied the principle of deterrence would in this case satisfy that
of retribution.) In relation to deterrence, he said :"
With respect, II think that - the learned magistrate completely overlooked
the principle of deterrence. Considering the amount of construction
zs Supra, footnote 2, at p . 216 .
3o
Ibid., at p .217 .
3' Ibid.
32 Ibid., at p. 218 .
11 Ibid.
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128

LA REVUE DU BARREAU CANADIEN

[VOL . XLVII

work that goes on in British Columbia, the vast sums involved in many
projects, and the opportunities that can arise to perpetrate profitable
frauds, the imposition here of a sentence of imprisonment of one. month
-a fine of $2,000 means next to nothing to a man who is playing for
such high stakes-is well nigh an invitation to other men with good
reputations (which can be cited if need arises) low resistance to temptation and a desire to make large gains to run the risk of being found
out in a scheme to defraud those with whom they do business.

As stated earlier, we know very little about deterrence but the
above statement seems to make more common sense than any,
previous comment from the case under review .
These comments have been lengthy and the patient. reader
might well ask what use they serve. A mere comment on a single
case is both too short and too long because it cannot do justice to
the whole subject matter of criminal law, sentencing policy, criminology and corrections. Similarly, these problems cannot be properly exemplified by an isolated case decided by a magistrate who
has neither the time nor the expertise to take all these matters into
consideration. Furthermore, he is hardly in the proper, forum to
take such a broad view of the criminal process.
The case of Regina v. Hinch and Salanski is simply the most
recent illustration of the problem facing the criminal law and those
who administer it. We must be prepared to rethink our attitudes
toward all criminal offenders and our methods of punishing,
treating and rehabilitating them-not just some of them.
GRAHAM PARKER
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